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Abstract- In smart grid, the scale of pole devices that monitor the 
health of power lines is already large, and with the upgrade of the 
smart grid, the number of these resource-constrained devices is 
further increasing. These devices are easy targets to security 
attacks due to wireless access communication and due to weak 
passwords used to access and read telemetric data by the pole 
maintenance personnel.  
In this paper, we present a scalable and automated password-
changing protocol framework for unique authentication of human 
personnel (driver) with large scale of pole devices, and for secure 
collection of telemetric data from the pole devices. Our protocol 
framework employs physical per-driver, per-pole-device 
information as well as fractal functions to generate new unique 
passwords and secrete keys for different drivers over a large scale 
of pole devices and over long periods of time. Our experiments 
confirm that the password-changing protocol authenticates and 
transmits pole device data securely and in real-time under 
varying maintenance scenarios. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The current power grid system and its power lines in the field 
are monitored by telemetric devices, which are sensors with 
capacitor banks and are placed on top of electric poles. They 
measure frequency, voltage and current readings from power 
lines, which need to be maintained in the field. The 
maintenance personnel (drivers) from utility companies collect 
data readings from these telemetric devices to their handheld 
devices on a regular basis to ensure that the health of power 
line is sound and stable as shown in Figure 1. Also, when 
damage occurs due to any kind of natural disasters (e.g., 
storm), the utility companies find out the faulty location by 
analyzing the unusual data readings taken from these devices.  
In the current power grid system, security of data inside 
of the telemetric and handheld devices is one important 
concern. The telemetric and handheld devices and their data 
are easy target to security attacks due to the wireless 
communication over which data are read from/to the 
telemetric device to/from the handheld device of the driver 
(maintenance personnel), and due to the weak passwords and 
vulnerable authentication protocol that utilities use to access 
the handheld and telemetric devices. Especially with the 
increased scale of these small resource-constrained devices, 
due to on-going upgrade of smart grid, the security threats are 
further increasing. 
Therefore, the goal in this paper is to investigate a robust, 
scalable password-changing protocol framework to ensure 
device authentication and secure access to data inside the 
handheld and telemetric resource-constrained devices along 
with the secure delivery of data over the wireless network in 
the field as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Fig. 1. In- field Scenario 
Password verification problem over an insecure network 
has been researched for very long time. There are many 
existing solutions for solving password based authentication 
problem over an insecure network. Public-key based 
cryptography is a fundamental and widely used solution. Gong 
et al. introduced an asymmetric PKI model in [8], where, in 
addition to a password, the user uses the public key of the 
server. Later Halevi and Krawczyk [9] have given formal 
definitions and proofs of security in this setting. Another 
setting for this problem is one where two parties share only one 
password and neither party knows each other’s public-key. 
This setting was first considered by Bellovin and Merritt in [2] 
which is known as Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol. 
They implemented EKE protocol using RSA [3] and Diffie–
Hellman [4] asymmetric cryptosystems. Complexity of these 
RSA and Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem relies on mathematical 
relationships, i.e., integer factorization and discrete 
logarithmic problems, respectively. Protocols such as SPEKE 
[11], DHEKE [5], A-EKE [7], SRP [6] have been proposed in 
later time which are stronger protocols of the EKE family. 
However, these public-key based authentication mechanisms 
incur heavy computation and memory overhead during the 
processes of signature generation and validation [13]. On the 
contrary, in symmetric-key cryptography, identical keys are 
used for both encryption and decryption and each trading 
partner can use the same publicly known encryption algorithm; 
no need for developing and exchanging secret algorithms here. 
Although they are much simpler and faster than these public-
key based authentication mechanisms, they are not as strong as 
public-key cryptography. The main drawback of symmetric 
encryption is that a shared secret key must be agreed upon by 
both parties prior to any communication in a very secure 
manner. In addition, authenticity of the origin cannot be proved 
when the secret key is shared among multiple devices. 
However, in our approach we use both public-key 
cryptography and symmetric-key cryptography to achieve 
better performance.  
In this paper, we propose a fast, cost-effective, scalable, 
and robust password-changing protocol framework, which 
ensures generation of strong passwords to access different pole 
telemetric devices in different maintenance situations. We 
generate device passwords to be used for authentication 
between handheld and telemetric devices and shared keys to be 
used for secure data communication, using physical 
information such as local time, pole location, device ID, and 
user ID, and fractal functions. Our protocol framework 
ensures that device passwords and shared exchange keys are 
changing each time a operator (maintenance personnel) 
accesses a telemetric device and its data using his/her handheld 
device along his/her route, and data are transmitted in secure 
and real-time manner.  Our analysis and results confirm the 
claims. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II 
the model and set of assumptions considered are defined. 
Section III describes the details of the proposed scheme. We 
carry out the security analysis of the proposed scheme in 
section IV. Section V addresses performance and 
implementation issues. We conclude in section VI. 
 
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
A. Network Model 
In the system, sensor and capacitor banks placed on 
electric poles measure telemetric measurements from power 
line and store it as shown in Figure 1. A radio is attached 
underneath the capacitor banks; this radio is used to get the 
stored data readings. For ease of the reading, we will consider 
two devices, a telemetric device that produces data 
measurements from the capacitor banks and a telemetric 
device-reader as a handheld device throughout this paper. A 
point-to-point radio (wireless) network is established between 
the handheld device and the telemetric device during 
communication of these two parties. The standard we use in 
our validation is IEEE 802.11, however other wireless 
standards such as IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee) can be used. 
 
B. Data Model 
Usually, telemetric devices collect telemetric 
measurements of frequency, voltage, current readings of power 
lines. These telemetric measurements are sent from the 
telemetric device to the driver’s handheld device over the 
wireless network in small packets. 
  
C. User Security Model 
We assume that operator can memorize a password, 
serving as a user password, and a PIN (Personal Identification 
Number), serving as a user name, for authentication. The 
password and PIN are given to the operator by the utility. With 
this information, he/she logs into the handheld device (Note: 
The functionalities of handheld device are built into the car, 
hence the driver (maintenance personnel) may login with 
password and PIN once, when he/she starts driving, and not at 
each pole.) The list of PINs and corresponding passwords (in 
hashed form) is saved in the handheld device memory. Our 
protocol assumes that there is a trusted setup phase at the 
utility site, prior to any communication, in which the 
employee’s password and PIN information is stored (in hashed 
format) in a database of the handheld device memory. 
In addition, necessary crypto functions such as mixing 
function, key derivation fractal function, AES symmetric key 
function; crypto algorithms such as iterated block cipher, are 
agreed upon and installed on handheld and telemetric devices 
(Note: Installation or refresh configuration of functions/keys 
on telemetric devices is critical, but out of scope in this paper.) 
Symmetric key encryption is used, i.e., a shared secret key is 
used for both encryption and decryption of the packets to send 
them over the wireless network. For current scenario, 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used since it is fast in 
both software and hardware and performs well on a wide 
variety of hardware. 
 
D. Attack Model 
Since the whole system exists in an open environment, 
security barrier to prevent unauthorized access from outside of 
the domain is very necessary. An attacker may try to get access 
of the devices by faking identities if the attacker gets the 
common password. Since the network is wireless, attacker may 
get detailed information easily by eavesdropping on the 
communications. Even worse, attackers may physically capture 
telemetric devices, read cryptographic information out of 
memory and exaggerate their infections. Under cover of faked 
identities, they can perform various types of attacks, like denial 
of service attack, bad data injection and others. A detailed 
security analysis is provided in section IV.  
 
III. APPROACH 
This section presents our password-changing protocol that 
provides robust authentication and secure communication. We 
divide our approach in three phases:   
• Phase 1:  Authentication protocol of a maintenance 
personnel to the handheld device,  
• Phase 2: Authentication protocol between the handheld 
device and the telemetric device and 
• Phase 3: Secure communication protocol between the 
telemetric device and the handheld device 
As mentioned earlier, the set of activities on phase 1, i.e., 
authentication of the maintenance personnel to the handheld 
device, needs to be performed once, when s/he starts driving 
for collecting data. Whereas, the handheld device needs to 
authenticate itself to each telemetric device with a unique 
password at each pole location and collect data readings 
afterwards. Detailed steps of these phases are described as 
follows. Necessary mathematical notations of the symbols used 
in this section are given in Table 1. 
 
A. Phase 1 
All methods of human authentication fall into three broad 
categories [6]: 
• the knowledge factors: Something the user knows (e.g., 
password, pass phrase, PIN, response to a challenge) 
• the ownership factors: Something the user has (e.g., ID 
card, security token, software token, cell phone) 
• the inherence factors: Something the user is or does 
(e.g., fingerprint, retinal pattern, DNA sequence, 
signature, face, voice) 
In our approach, we consider mostly the first category 
since it is easier to use, convenient and less expensive to 
deploy, than token-based or biometric methods. This phase 
deals with the authentication of OP to HH, yet maintaining the 
integrity of OP. The authentication process consists of three 
steps:  
1) Entering user name, password 
2) Solving challenge-response query or 
3) Responding to CAPTCHA query 
i. Text-based CAPTCHA query or 
ii. Image based CAPTCHA query or 
iii. Utility code verification 
The first step ensures integrity of an operator while 
collecting data at poles along his/her route. The second step 
ensures the uniqueness of the OP by challenge-response. 
Finally the third step ensures that actually a human enters the 
above two steps of information and not a robot.  
Step 1: The operator OP enters his/her PIN and a common 
password into HH. Upon receiving PIN and OP-password, HH 
verifies the PIN, OP-password combination. PIN, which is a 
low-entropy number, enables the system to verify the integrity 
of OP, i.e., it keeps track, which OP is logging in. The reason 
is that it is always easier for an insider to break the system than 
an outsider, and hence, we used a way to identify the 
responsible person.    
Step 2: In the next step, OP performs a challenge-response 
query by entering operator’s secret question answer SQA. Since 
many people put a lot of their private information on social 
networking sites, it is easy for an attacker to find the answer to 
any private question such as maiden name, date of birth and 
others. Therefore, instead of using the traditional challenge-
response approach, the query should be rather employment or 
company specific i.e., something that only employee knows the 
answer. These secret question answers are different for each 
operator, are chosen prior to the data collection and stored in 
the handheld device in hash forms in the trusted setup phase. 
This step is included to ensure that even if HH is stolen, the 
intruder cannot have access to HH to get access to the TD. 
 
TABLE I 
MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS 
 Symbol Definition 
OP, HH, TD 
 
PIN 
SQA 
challengeH 
H() 
EPUi() 
 
DPRi() 
 
EP’’() 
P 
p’ 
p’’ 
k 
Scur,L, Sprev,L 
r 
t 
HDid 
ACK 
ERR 
TER 
Q() 
f() 
i 
RAND 
Msign 
System Principals (Operator, Handheld 
Device, Telemetric Device) 
Personal Identification Number 
Secret Question/Answer  
Challenge created by HH 
One-way hash function 
Encrypt operation with Public Key of ith 
telemetric device 
Decrypt operation with Private Key of ith 
telemetric device 
Encrypt operation with secret key, p’’ 
Session Shared Key of 128 bit  
k Most Significant Bits(MSB) of P 
(128-k) Least Significant Bits of P 
Number of MSB of P to verify 
Salt (current and previous) at Location L 
Random number in range [3,4)  
Time (time stamp) 
Handheld  Device id 
Acknowledgement 
Error message 
Terminate message  
Iterated Block Cipher Algorithm 
Mixing function 
Integer 
128-bit random challenge 
Message M  is signed by the private key 
of the telemetric device 
 
One way hash function, H() is used to make sure that even 
if a HH is stolen, i.e., the database of HH is compromised, an 
intruder cannot get OP’s password file or secret question 
answers, impersonate as a legitimate operator and use the 
device. HH looks up the PIN entry and fetches the stored hash 
value of secret question answer from memory. It also computes 
the hash of received value H(SQA) and verifies if this 
calculated value matches with the stored one. 
Step 3: When the handheld device finds a valid PIN, it 
starts collecting physical information, i.e., GPS location, 
temperature, humidity, time t and handheld device ID (HDid). 
Here device ID, HDid is some unique physical information 
(e.g., 48 bit MAC address) of the HH. Timestamp t, PIN and 
handheld device ID are used to calculate P (session shared 
key) later in phase 2. In this phase, HH combines location, 
temperature, humidity and time to create a CAPTCHA 
automatically. CAPTCHA is a program that generates and 
grades tests that are human solvable, but beyond the 
capabilities of current computer programs [10]. Thereby, in our 
approach, CAPTCHA is used to protect handheld devices 
against remote software robots to get access to the telemetric 
device. In [12] different types of CAPTCHAs are presented 
such as text-based, audio, image-based and others. In our 
protocol, an OP can choose to respond to either text-based or 
image-based CAPTCHA; or he can verify himself entering the 
code given by utility company. The use of physical 
information to generate random CAPTCHAs results in 
different CAPTCHA each time and thus increases the strength 
of this phase. Fig. 2 formalizes the above procedure. The GUI 
of this section is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
 
 
Fig . 2: GUI for the maintenance personnel with options 
 
Fig. 3 formalizes the above procedure of a robust 
authentication of phase 1. Now if the PIN and OP-password, 
inserted by operator, are valid and he can answer CAPTCHA 
correctly, (which indicates a person with a valid PIN is present 
at the location) the integrity of the OP is assured. In the next 
phase, it sends the login request message to the TD. 
 
 
OP          HH 
1. Enter PIN and Password 
    1. Verify PIN, Password 
    2. Show Question SQA 
2. Enter Answer SQA 
    2. Check  added SQA 
3. Collect Physical 
Information (e.g., location, 
temperature, Time t, HDid) 
    3. Generate CAPTCHA 
3. Enter Answer of CAPTCHA 
    3. Verify CAPTCHA Answer 
 
Fig. 3: Phase 1 - Authentication of operator 
B. Phase 2 
In this phase, when the OP comes within the wireless 
network, the HH sends PIN, t and HDid (collected in phase 1) 
in the form of login request message, m1. The handheld 
device encrypts the message m1 with the public key PUi of the 
TD ‘i’. The HH transmits the encrypted message to the TD 
over the wireless network to initiate a conversation with the 
TD. The procedure for this phase is shown in Fig. 4.  
At this point, the telemetric device gets driver’s 
(maintenance personnel) PIN, timestamp (at which the driver 
logged in to the handheld device) and handheld device ID by 
decrypting the received message using its own private key. TD 
then generates a random number and transmits it to handheld 
device after signing it with its private key, to ensure the 
authenticity of the message.  This protects against man-in-the-
middle attack. Both devices start calculating password, P using 
following equation: P = Q ( PIN, Scur, L , RAND ). Here, Q() is 
an iterated Block Cipher Algorithm and Scur, L is a salt 
combined with the PIN and RAND to make a dictionary 
attack expensive. 
In our approach, a fractal function S is used to calculate 
salt value, Scur, L. Current salt value, Scur, L of location L depends 
on the previous salt value, Sprev, L that is stored at TD of 
location L. Both devices calculate Scur, L by the following 
equation: Scur, L = r * Sprev, L * ( 1  –  Sprev, L ).  
This fractal function has the property that for a particular 
value of r in the range [3,4), the salt values repeat over an 
interval, e.g., for r = 3.2, four values of Scur,L are different and 
appear random to an attacker, but after the forth value, 
repetition of the four values occurs. For other values of r, the 
repetition interval is different. In our approach, both devices 
generate r using a mixing function f() taking the inputs device 
ID, and time t using the equation:  r = f ( HDid, t ).  
Here device ID, HDid is some unique physical information 
(e.g., 48 bit MAC address) of the handheld device, HD. The 
reason for using physical information to calculate r is to giving 
insufficient information (the attacker does not have device ID 
or timestamp, t) to an outside intruder to mount dictionary 
attack against the password, P.  
 
 
HH   TD 
m1 = PIN || t || HDid	  
c1 = EPUi ( m1 ) 
 
 
    m1 = DPRi ( c1 ) 
    Generate RAND 
 
 
r = f(HDid, t)   r = f(HDid, t)  
Scur, L=r*Sprev, L*(1 – Sprev, L)  Scur, L=r*Sprev, L*(1 – Sprev, L) 
 P = Q(PIN, Scur, L, RAND )  P = Q(PIN, Scur, L, RAND ) 
p’ = k most significant bits of P  
m2 = p’|| k 
c2 = EPUi ( m2 )    
     
 
m2 = DPRi( c2) 
Get k , (p’)HH from m2  
Calculate (p’)TD  
    Verify p’, i.e.,  
    Compare (p’)HH and (p’)TD 
    If yes, send ACK 
    If not, send ERR 
       
 
 
Fig. 4. Phase 2 - Authentication of handheld device 
 
In our password changing protocol, only k most significant 
bits (MSB) of Pare used as device password (p’) for the 
authentication of HH to TD (different from the OP’s common 
password entered in phase 1). Rest of the bits of P is used as 
symmetric key (p’’) for secure communication of data between 
HH and TD in phase 3. HH chooses k randomly, appends the 
value of k with p’, encrypts it with the public key of TD and 
transmits the encrypted message to the TD as the computed 
response. Since only that particular TD has the private key, no 
other device can decrypt the message. Upon receiving the 
encrypted message, c2, the telemetric device decrypts it by: m2 
= DPRi ( c2 ). The telemetric device checks for the received and 
calculated k-bit values. If the received and calculated k-bit 
values do not match with each other, the authentication is 
failed and an error message, ERR is sent. Otherwise, an 
acknowledgement, ACK is sent to the HD. This ERR or ACK 
message is sent after signing it with the private key, so that the 
handheld device knows that this message comes from the 
telemetric device but from any other devices. In this way, 
authenticity of the message is maintained by signing every 
message from TD with it’s own private key (PRi) and 
confidentiality of the message is maintained by encrypting 
every message from HH with the public key (PUi) of TD. Thus 
in this phase, the authentication of the handheld device to the 
telemetric device is accomplished. 
 
C. Phase 3 
In this phase, secure delivery of the telemetric data is 
ensured. Both devices use a symmetric key encryption and the 
symmetric key p” is the (128 – k) bits of P derived in phase 2. 
The telemetric device reads the telemetric measurements from 
memory and encrypts that data with the calculated key, p’’ by: 
d = EP’’ ( data ). The telemetric device sends d to handheld 
device over the wireless network.  
Upon receiving the encrypted data, handheld device 
decrypts it with p’’ by: data = DP’’ ( d ) and stores the data on 
handheld device in secure database. Finally, they conclude 
when the telemetric device sends a TD-signed termination 
message, TER, to ensure that the session is terminated.  Fig. 5 
shows the details. 
 
 
HH    TD 
   Read telemetric data  
   d = EP’’(data)  
   
data= DP’’(d)  
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Phase 3 - Communication between two devices 
 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Our approach correctly generates a valid password at the 
handheld device if OP supplies a correct credential (i.e. PIN, 
password) and the software on both sides performs correctly. 
However, it is more difficult to show that our protocol is 
secure. In this section we analyze the security of our password 
changing protocol against different types of attacks.  
Replay Attack: Our protocol does not use a stored password 
for authentication of HH; rather HH generates unique 
password, p’ instantly. So, an attacker cannot use password of 
current session in any future sessions to authenticate a device 
to TD. Thus our protocol thwarts replay attack. 
Forward secrecy: If the intruder guesses a password during 
one successful run, it should not allow him to determine the 
password of past sessions–known as forward secrecy. If an 
intruder guesses p’ from overhearing c2, s/he cannot reproduce 
P for future sessions since salt is not exchanged but stored in 
TD and HH. Thus Our protocol maintains forward secrecy. 
Dictionary attack: In our protocol, important messages (m1, 
m2) are encrypted before transmitting. This prevents the 
attacker from being able to guess necessary parameters based 
d	  
TERsign	  
(ACK/ERR)sign	  
c1	  
RANDsign	  
c2	  
on exchanged messages to calculate and verify P. We use 
physical information (HDid, t) to calculate r to give insufficient 
information to an intruder to mount dictionary attack against P. 
First of all, the attacker does not have device ID or timestamp, 
t. In addition, the value of r is generated each time immediately 
prior communication. Also, by using salt our protocol makes it 
slower for an intruder to mount dictionary attacks. 
MITM Attack: A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, which 
requires an attacker to fool both sides of a legitimate 
conversation [6], is not possible in our protocol. An intruder 
can sit in the middle of handheld device HH and telemetric 
device TD, block the messages (c1, c2, RANDsign, 
ACK/ERR/TERsign) sent by HH or TD and send garbled 
messages acting like either HH or TD. Since, every message 
from TD is signed by the private key (PRi) and all messages 
from HH are encrypted by the public key (PUi) of TD, 
assuming that the private key is not compromised, the intruder 
cannot sign or decrypt the messages. Thus, our protocol 
protects against MITM attack. 
 
Fig. 6. Experimental Setup 
 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
The implementation setup is shown in Fig. 6. One laptop is 
used as the handheld device of the operator and another laptop 
is used as the telemetric device having telemetric readings. For 
both laptops, we used Intel Core 2 Duo 2.26GHz processors 
with 2GB read-only memory. The prototype is implemented in 
java so that it can be easily ported into the mobile devices. The 
communications between the laptops are performed using wifi. 
AES symmetric key cryptography is used for encryption and 
decryption of the shared key (in phase 2) and the telemetric 
readings (in phase 3). 
 
Fig. 7. Execution time of password changing algorithm in three phases for 
different executions 
Fig. 7 shows the execution time of password changing 
algorithm in different phases for different executions. Since, 
the authentication process of operator in Phase 1 is only 
responsible for challenge-response, generating and verifying 
CAPTCHAs locally at the handheld device; the process 
requires very low time and space complexity. Also, the 
operator side delay is considered negligible here. Therefore, 
the execution time in Phase 1 is very small. However, the 
execution times in Phase 2 and Phase 3 are large and lie in the 
range of 400 - 500 ms each. The round trip time from and to 
handheld device and telemetric device and encryption- 
decryption time is the main reason for the large value of 
execution time in phase 2 and phase 3. 
 
 
Fig. 8(a). Execution time (ms) in phase 1 
 
Fig. 8(b). Execution time (ms) in phase 2 
 
To understand the execution time of different steps in each 
phase, we represent pie charts in Fig. 8 dissecting the average 
execution time of each phase. Fig. 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) shows 
 
  
Fig. 8(c). Execution time (ms) in phase 3 
three different pie charts for phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3 
respectively.  In phase 1, solving challenge-response query, 
generation of CAPTCHA and verification of CAPTCHA take 
almost equal time (Fig. 8(a)). In phase 2, the average execution 
time is 450.4915ms. The protocol takes very small amount of 
time (0.57ms) for key generation. The rest of the time is taken 
mainly on encryption-decryption along with wireless 
communication between two laptops. In Fig. 8(c) the execution 
time for each step for phase 3 is shown. The AES encryption 
and decryption of the shared key (in phase 2) and the 
telemetric readings (in phase 3) take most of the time.  On the 
other hand the key generation and exchange of key takes very 
small amount of time.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we highlight one of the authentication 
problems in the smart grid critical infrastructure; the weak 
access control and vulnerable authentication/secure 
transmission protocol to telemetric pole devices in the field. 
Our password-changing protocol framework achieves creating 
passwords and shared keys based on physical characteristics 
such as per-pole-device locality, per-pole temporal and per-
driver identifications (e.g., PIN, HDid). The experimental 
results show that our scheme is computationally efficient, and 
yields strong security for large number of TD devices in 
varying maintenance scenarios.   
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